More than ever before, outside directors who sit on company boards are asserting their authority and assuming greater responsibility to ensure corporate operations are smooth – and to avoid a crisis. Although it’s not a board’s mission or responsibility to manage a company, these days the strategic oversight that independent directors can provide increasingly comes to the forefront across a range of issues – but none more tangible than in times of crisis.
Not surprisingly, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is a major driver of this sea change. SOX mandated, among other things that only independent directors with no affiliation to the companies they served could sit on certain board committees. This measure not only gave boards more independence, but more responsibility – and liability – as well.
For example, in a banner class-action lawsuit against WorldCom led by the New York State Common Retirement Fund, the telecommunications giant’s independent directors were ruled negligent and personally liable for a portion of the company’s losses, which directors were ordered to pay out of their own pockets. This outcome shivered the spines of independent directors everywhere, reinforcing the serious nature and potential consequences of their duties, and also catalyzing a new awareness of the greater crisis management roles that they would now have to play.
In light of such increased personal responsibility and liability, independent directors have an even greater vested interest in building and protecting the reputation of the companies whose boards they sit on. As a result, the burden on directors to know more as well as do more increases exponentially. For example, when Jerry Levin became CEO of what was then Sunbeam Corp. in the late 1990s, he was surprised at how little the board knew about the accounting problem that was then roiling the corporate waters. That wouldn’t happen today.
Because their overall responsibilities as directors are unique, so too are the specific strategic actions they can take in a crisis situation, which might include:
Finally, and especially in a post-SOX environment, boards must be chosen with an eye to the broadest, as well as deepest, available expertise. There was, for example, a dearth of bankruptcy expertise among HealthSouth Corp. directors in the post-Richard Scrushy period that protracted the discussion of whether or not to even seek bankruptcy protection.
Such cases suggest a need to elect outside directors in the same way as companies assign crisis teams – with an abiding need to cover all bases and anticipate multifaceted corporate contingencies. In turn, directors should be given the training they need in order to perform their roles.
Being the director of a publicly-traded company today is a momentous task – and one that has never been so critical.